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Abstract 
Regional monetary and financial cooperation in Asia has been discussed for years. To move 
towards a coordinated exchange rate policy, Ogawa and Shimizu (2005) proposed both an 
Asian Monetary Unit (AMU), which is a common currency basket computed as a weighted 
average of the thirteen ASEAN+3 currencies, and AMU Deviation Indicators (AMU DIs), 
which indicates the deviation of each Asian currency in terms of the AMU compared with the 
benchmark rate. The AMU and the AMU DIs are considered both as surveillance measures 
under the Chiang Mai Initiative and as benchmarks for coordinated exchange rate policies 
among Asian countries. In this paper, the authors show that monitoring the AMU and the 
AMU DIs plays an important role in the regional surveillance process under the Chiang Mai 
Initiative. By using daily and monthly data of AMU and AMU DIs for the period from January 
2000 to June 2010, which are available from the website of the Research Institute of 
Economy, Trade, and Industry (RIETI), they examine their usefulness as a surveillance 
indicator. Our studies of AMU and AMU DIs confirm the following: first, an AMU peg system 
stabilizes the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) of each Asian country. Second, the 
AMU and the AMU DIs could signal overvaluation or undervaluation for each of the Asian 
currencies. Third, trade imbalances within the region have been growing as the AMU DIs 
have been widening. Fourth, the AMU DIs could predict huge capital inflows and outflows for 
each Asian country. The above findings support the usefulness of using the AMU and the 
AMU DIs as surveillance indicators for monetary cooperation in Asia. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Regional monetary and financial cooperation among the monetary authorities of Asian 
countries has become more robust since the recent global financial crisis of 2007–
2008.  On 24 March 2010, Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the 
ASEAN members states, the People’s Republic of China (hereafter, PRC), Japan, and 
the Republic of Korea (ASEAN+3), plus the monetary authority of Hong Kong, China, 
announced that the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) Agreement had 
officially come into effect. They also reached agreement on establishing a surveillance 
office in Singapore, called the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO). 
Finance Ministers of the ASEAN+3 countries now have to ensure that technical details 
are ironed out. AMRO will monitor and analyze the regional economies, which will 
contribute to early detection of possible currency crises, swift implementation of 
remedial actions, and effective decision-making in the region.  
Regional monetary cooperation in Asia has been discussed for years. Increased 
cooperation has been deemed necessary not only for preventing future currency crises 
but also for keeping intra-regional capital flows and exchange rates stable. A number of 
ideas for how best to promote regional monetary cooperation have been proposed. 
One way is to create a common currency basket (or regional monetary unit, RMU) and 
use it for economic surveillance. A common currency basket system with a fluctuation 
band, one similar to the so-called “BBC rule” suggested by Williamson (2000), would 
be an effective way to detect exchange rate misalignment among Asian currencies. 
Ogawa and Shimizu (2005) proposed both an Asian Monetary Unit (AMU), which is a 
common currency basket computed as a weighted average of the  thirteen Asian 
currencies, and AMU deviation indicators (AMU DIs), which indicate  the level of 
deviation of each Asian currency, in terms of the AMU, from the benchmark rate.
1
                                                 
1 For details on the AMU and AMU Deviation Indicators, see Appendix. 
 The 
AMU and AMU DIs are considered both surveillance measures under the Chiang Mai 
Initiative and coordinated exchange rate policies among East Asian countries. In this 
paper, we show that monitoring the AMU and AMU DIs plays an important role in the 
regional surveillance process under the CMIM. By using daily and monthly data of AMU 
and AMU DIs in the period from January 2000 through June 2010, available from the 
website of the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry (RIETI) in Japan, 
we consider the following questions: First, how did the AMU move in relation to the ADBI Working Paper 275    Ogawa and Shimizu 
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three major currencies—the US dollar, the euro, and the yen? Second, how could they 
stabilize a nominal effective exchange rate (NEER)? Third, how well did they do in 
predicting the Asian currency crisis and the recent 2007–2008 global financial crisis? 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of 
previous research on proposals for a common currency basket among Asian countries. 
Section 3 investigates the AMU and its relationship with the three major currencies. 
Section 4 focuses on a  comparison between a NEER  calculated by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) and a NEER under the hypothetical AMU peg system. 
The comparisons tell us how the AMU stabilizes a NEER among Asian currencies. 
Section 5 investigates the AMU and AMU DIs during the Asian currency crisis in 1997 
and during the recent global financial crisis from  2007–2008. Finally, Section 6 
summarizes our analytical results and provides concluding remarks. 
2.  RELATED RESEARCH ON COMMON CURRENCY 
BASKETS IN ASIA 
After the Asian currency crisis of 1997, some Asian countries, including Singapore and 
Malaysia (since July 2005), adopted a currency system in line with a “Basket, Band, 
and Crawling” (BBC) rule.
2
As  Asian economies  have experienced  greater  interdependence  in terms of intra-
regional trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), it has become increasingly important 
to establish regional currency coordination in order to minimize exchange rate 
fluctuations and exchange rate risk in international trade and investments within the 
 During the recent global financial crisis from 2007–2008, 
however, a number of Asian currencies depreciated sharply while the Japanese yen 
has been appreciating against the other Asian currencies. At the same time, the 
Chinese yuan has remained relatively stable, especially against the US dollar, despite 
the Chinese government’s  July 2005 announcement  to adopt a managed floating 
exchange rate system with reference to a currency basket. As a result, movements in 
intra-regional exchange rates among Asian currencies have changed dramatically. 
Such large fluctuation among intra-regional exchange rates is undesirable for the Asian 
economy where the private sector has established production networks.  
                                                 




3. One proposed approach is to create a common currency basket, which will 
serve as an anchor for Asian currencies. Ogawa and Shimizu (2005) proposed an 
Asian Monetary Unit (AMU), which is computed as the weighted average of thirteen 
Asian currencies (the ASEAN countries, the PRC, Japan, and the Republic of Korea). 
Moreover, we have developed AMU Deviation Indicators based on the AMU in order to 
monitor  fluctuations and misalignments of intra-regional  exchange rates under the 
Chiang Mai Initiative.
4
There  are  other proposals  to stabilize intra-regional exchange rates among Asian 
currencies without depending on any common currency basket. For example, Ma and 
McCauley (2008) have  suggested  that stability of intra-Asian exchange rates might 
build on similar national policies of stabilizing home currencies against their own 
respective currency baskets, a prospect made possible by the similarities among these 
countries’  trade-weighted currency baskets. Similarly, Wyplosz and Park (2008) 
advocate adopting a currency basket peg vis-à-vis that country’s non-regional trading 
partners, which they argue is sufficient  to stabilize the exchange rate. Both of the 
studies indicate that the effective exchange rates of Asian currencies can be stabilized 
without any further monetary cooperation. Shimizu and Ogawa (2009), in a more recent 
analysis, find  strong relationships between  NEERs, the AMU,  and AMU Deviation 
Indicators even during the global financial crisis. Their study suggests that an individual 
basket system is appropriate for Asian countries at the first stage of exchange rate 
 The AMU DIs are employed as benchmarks for enabling the 
monetary authorities of Asian countries to maintain regional coordination in exchange 
rate policies. Using these indicators, the monetary authorities can ensure that each of 
their Asian currencies does not deviate markedly from a common currency basket or 
the AMU. This would enable these countries to achieve stability among intra-regional 
exchange rates and float jointly against outside currencies, include the US dollar and 
the  euro. Ogawa and Shimizu (2007)  also  proposed a step-wise approach for 
transitioning from an individual currency basket system to a common currency basket 
system in Asia as an additional proposal. 
                                                 
3 On one hand, Ravenhill (2009) claimed that the current East Asian corporation was shallow and its 
shallowness reflected the primacy of political motivations in driving intra governmental agreement on 
trade and finance. 
4 Such a unit has also been extensively discussed in East Asia, for example, in the ADB (Kuroda and 
Kawai, 2003). The data for AMU and AMU Deviation Indicators has been published on the website of 
RIETI (http://www.rieti.go.jp/users/amu/en/index.html) since September 2005. ADBI Working Paper 275    Ogawa and Shimizu 
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policy coordination. In this sense, it seems that the aforementioned proposals are not 
fundamentally different, at least as a first step. 
3.  DECOMPOSITION OF THE AMU 
Currency regimes adopted by Asian countries differ from each other, and their choices 
are broad-ranging—from a hard peg (a currency board) to  a managed float (with 
reference to a currency basket) to a free float. In other words, Asian currencies’ degree 
of linkage with the US dollar varies from very strong (under a hard peg to the US 
dollar), weak (under a soft peg to the US dollar), to no relationship at all (under a free 
float). The AMU also has some degree of linkage with the US dollar because it is 
composed of the thirteen Asian currencies. Movements in the AMU should thus reflect 
the choice of currency regime in the region. 
Following the methods of Frankel and Wei (1994), we identify estimated coefficients on 
the US dollar, the euro, and the Japanese yen for the AMU to investigate how strong 
the linkages are between the AMU and the three major currencies. We use daily data 
of exchange rates to estimate the following regression equation for each year for the 





If Asian countries actually shift their currency regimes from a strict or de facto US dollar 
peg to an individual currency basket system, the AMU’s linkage with the US dollar 
should become weaker while its relationship with the euro becomes stronger. Since the 
Japanese yen is one of the composition currencies of the AMU, the coefficient on the 
Japanese yen should be the same as a weight of the Japanese yen in the AMU. 
However, if an estimated coefficient is smaller than the basket weight, it means that the 
monetary authorities of the other Asian countries conduct an exchange rate policy 
without regard for stability against the Japanese yen. In this connection, the linkage 
between the AMU and the three major currencies reflects currency regime or exchange 
rate policy adopted by the monetary authorities of the Asian countries. 
                                                 
5 In the 2010 sample, we use daily data from 4 January to 30 June 2010. The data of foreign exchange 
rate vis-à-vis the AMU are from RIETI and Datastream.  
Sfr Yen Sfr Euro Sfr USD o Sfr AMU e c e c e c c e / 3 / 2 / 1 /     ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + =ADBI Working Paper 275    Ogawa and Shimizu 
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Table 1 summarizes the analytical results of the regression. Figure 1 plots movements 
in the estimated coefficients of the three major currencies year by year. In the sub-
sample periods from 2000 to 2005, coefficients on the US dollar decreased from 70% 
to 58%. On one hand, coefficients on the Japanese yen increased from 32% to 37%. 
Coefficients on the euro became significant in 2003 and 2004 even though they are just 
about 5%. The analytical results indicate that Asian countries shifted from the US dollar 
peg system to an individual basket peg system.ADBI Working Paper 275    Ogawa and Shimizu 
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Table 1: AMU De-composition with Three Major Currencies 
 
Source: Author’s calculation; data of foreign exchange rate vis-à-vis the AMU are from RIETI and Datastream. 
Note:  *** significant at 1% level    ** sigunificant at 5% level   * significant at 10% level
Dependent Variable: AMU/SFR 
Method: Least Squares 
Variable  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Constant  0.0002  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0001  0.0000  -0.0001  -0.0002 
US dollar  0.7046  ***  0.7080  ***  0.6496  ***  0.6511  ***  0.6302  ***  0.5844  ***  0.6361  ***  0.6754  ***  0.6865  ***  0.6472  ***  0.6808  *** 
Euro  0.0153  -0.0106  -0.0321  0.0509  **  0.0516  **  0.0408  0.0830  *  0.1499  ***  0.1544  ***  0.1210  ***  0.0996  *** 
Japanese yen  0.3219  ***  0.3267  ***  0.3177  ***  0.3298  ***  0.3462  ***  0.3763  ***  0.3109  ***  0.2238  ***  0.2254  ***  0.2584  ***  0.2123  *** 
Adj. R-squared  0.9812  0.9793  0.9691  0.9814  0.9911  0.9719  0.9577  0.9458  0.9528  0.9737  0.9429 
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The Estimated Coefficients of the AMU 





Source: Authors’ calculations. 
However, in the sub-sample periods from 2006 to 2009, coefficients on the US dollar 
and the euro increased from 63% to 68% and from 8% to 15% in 2008, respectively. In 
contrast, coefficients on the Japanese yen decreased from 31% to 21% during that 
period. The analytical results indicate that Asian countries shifted back to a pro-US 
dollar foreign exchange rate policy or a US dollar peg system again. Comparison with 
the  estimated coefficients on the Japanese yen and its basket weight in the AMU 
suggests that the former (37.63) was larger than the latter (27.80) in 2005. However, 
the former (21.23) was smaller than the latter (26.44) in 2010. These results suggest 
that the monetary authorities of the other Asian countries have in recent times shifted 
from a pro-Japanese yen foreign exchange rate policy to a pro-US dollar policy.
6
Adopting a basket peg to one’s own currency would contribute to stabilization of intra-
regional foreign exchange rates among Asian currencies in the future, a finding in line 
with much of the research summarized in the previous section. However, most Asian 
countries’ current exchange rate policy is still far from an individual currency basket 
system, despite the fact that the monetary authorities of these countries should not 
heavily target the US dollar, but a basket of currencies. This is why common indicators, 
 
                                                 
6 Given the strong linkage of the Chinese yuan with the US dollar, it can be interpreted that Asian 
countries shifted to a pro-Chinese yuan exchange rate policy. ADBI Working Paper 275    Ogawa and Shimizu 
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such as the AMU and the AMU Deviation Indicators, may be especially useful for 
surveillance of intra-regional exchange rates. 
4.  HOW COULD THE AMU STABILIZE EFFECTIVE 
EXCHANGE RATES? 
Previous research has investigated the stabilizing effects of a common currency basket 
peg system on the  effective exchange rates of Asian currencies. For example, 
Williamson (2005) investigated whether the use of a common currency basket would 
provide adequate stability of the effective exchange rate for the participating countries’ 
currencies. Given two exchange rate systems—one an individual currency basket peg 
system, the  other a  common G3 currency basket peg system—Williamson 
demonstrated that the latter system  could stabilize  the  NEERs  of Asian currencies 
more effectively than the former. Similarly, Ogawa and Shimizu (2006) simulated how 
NEERs would have moved under alternative exchange rate systems,  including  an 
individual currency basket system, a G3 common currency basket system,  and an 
AMU peg system by using data on exchange rates of Asian currencies vis-à-vis the 
AMU during a sample period from 2000 to 2004. They obtained an analytical result that 
the AMU peg system stabilized  the NEERs more effectively for Indonesia, the 
Philippines, the Republic of Korea (hereafter, Korea), and Thailand than for the other 
countries with peg systems.  
In this paper, following Ogawa and Shimizu (2006), we extend the sample period from 
January 2005 and June 2010 to investigate the stabilization effects of the AMU peg 
system on the NEERs of East Asian currencies. Specifically, we compare standard 
deviations of NEERs under a hypothetical AMU peg system with those of NEERs 
calculated by the BIS (monthly average, 2005=100). Exchange rates of the Asian 
currencies in terms of the AMU, standardized as 100 in January 2005, are used to 
simulate NEERs under the hypothetical AMU peg system. Basket weights on each 
currency of the NEER are the same as those of NEERs calculated by the BIS. 
Table 2 summarizes the analytical results. Standard deviations of the NEERs under the 
hypothetical AMU peg system are lower than those of actual (historical) NEERs 
calculated by the BIS. Accordingly, we obtain an analytical result that the AMU peg 
system stabilized the NEERs of Asian currencies even during the global financial crisis. 
We also find that differentials in the standard deviations between actual NEERs and ADBI Working Paper 275    Ogawa and Shimizu 
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AMU-pegged  NEERs vary by country. For example, in the case of Singapore, the 
standard deviation of the NEER calculated by the BIS was 3.728, while that of NEER 
under the hypothetical AMU peg system was 2.321. Similarly, in the case of Malaysia, 
the standard deviation of NEER calculated by the BIS was 2.699,  while under the 
hypothetical AMU peg system it was 1.677. Thus, the differences are small in the case 
of Singapore and Malaysia, which adopted a managed floating exchange rate system 
with reference to a currency basket.ADBI Working Paper 275    Ogawa and Shimizu 
 
12 
Table 2: Standard Deviation of NEER (BIS) and NEER Simulated Under AMU Peg 
System, (Monthly Data, January 2005 to June 2010) 
 
Source: Autor’s calculations. 
Notes: (1) Standard deviations of month end nominal effective exchange rates calculated using January 
2005=100; (2) Nominal effective exchange rates (NEER) under the hypothetical AMU peg simulated by using 
each exchange rate vis-a-vis the AMU which is standardized at 100 in January 2005. The basket weights of 
NEER are same as those of NEER calculated by BIS.
People’s Republic of China (PRC)  8.280  2.715 
Indonesia  7.785  1.630 
Japan  7.968  2.773 
Republic of Korea  13.038  1.160 
Malaysia  2.699  1.677 
Philippines  10.148  1.486 
Singapore  3.728  2.321 





Country  NEER (BIS)   (1) 
NEER simulated under the 
AMU peg system   (2) ADBI Working Paper 275    Ogawa and Shimizu 
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On the other hand, in the case of Korea, which adopts a free-floating exchange rate 
system, the standard deviation of NEER calculated by the BIS was 13.038, compared 
to 1.160 calculated using the hypothetical AMU peg system. Similarly, in the case of 
Indonesia, the standard deviation of NEER calculated by the BIS was 7.785, compared 
to just 1.630 under the hypothetical AMU peg system. The results indicate that the 
NEER of free floating currencies are  dramatically more stable when  monetary 
authorities adopt an AMU peg system.  
Figure 2 plots movements in the two kinds of NEERs mentioned above, as well as the 
nominal exchange rate expressed in US dollar terms for reference, by country, for the 
period between January 2005 and June 2010. In the case of the PRC, the actual NEER 
calculated by the BIS appreciated more than 10% during the global financial crisis 
(2007–2008) although the nominal exchange rate of the Chinese yuan in terms of the 
US dollar was kept very stable. Had the monetary authority of the PRC adopted the 
AMU peg system during the same period, the Chinese yuan would have appreciated by 
less than half, in terms of the NEER. In the case of Korea, both the actual NEER 
calculated by the BIS and the nominal exchange rate of the Korean won in terms of the 
US dollar depreciated more than 30% during the global financial crisis. Had  the 
monetary authority of Korea adopted the AMU peg system in the same period, their 
NEER would have been kept very stable. The analytical results suggest that the AMU 
peg system would have  stabilized  the NEERs  of Asian currencies even during the 
global financial crisis. ADBI Working Paper 275    Ogawa and Shimizu 
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Korean won (Jan 2005 =100)
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Indonesian rupiah (Jan 2005 =100)
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Philippines peso (Jan 2005 =100)
NEER (AMU peg)
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Japanese yen (Jan 2005 =100)
NEER (AMU peg)
NEER (BIS)
Nominal Exchange Rate (vis-à-vis the US$)
 Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: AMU exchange rates have been downloaded from RIETI. NEERs (BIS) were downloaded from BIS. 
Nominal exchange rates were downloaded from Datastream. ADBI Working Paper 275    Ogawa and Shimizu 
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5.  AMU AND AMU DEVIATION INDICATORS DURING 
THE CRISES 
Our research used  the AMU and the AMU Deviation Indicators to conduct 
macroeconomic analysis for surveillance purposes. In this section, we focus on the 
Asian currency crisis in 1997 and the 2007–2008 global financial crisis. We investigate 
how accurately the AMU and AMU DIs predicted crisis situations as an earlly warning 
indicator during the two crises. 
5.1  AMU during the Asian Currency Crisis in 1997 
First, we apply both the AMU and the AMU DIs retroactively in the period around the 
Asian currency crisis in 1997,  before the benchmark period 2000–2001.
7
                                                 
7 For the retroactive calculation of the AMU and AMU DIs in the 1990s, we use the simulated euro before 
the introduction of the euro. 
 Figure 3 
shows the movements of the AMU in terms of the US dollar, the euro (or the weighted 
average of European currencies before January 1999), and the US dollar-euro basket 
currency from January 1995 to the end of 2000. In 1996, the exchange rate of the AMU 
in terms of the euro was around 1.0, while the exchange rate in terms of the US dollar 
was larger than 1.2. This means that the AMU was more than 20% overvalued vis-à-vis 
the US dollar in the period immediately before the Asian crisis, compared with the AMU 
benchmark year (2000–2001). ADBI Working Paper 275    Ogawa and Shimizu 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Figure 4 shows movements in the AMU DIs of some Asian currencies before and after 
the Asian currency crisis. It is clear that AMU DIs of crisis-hit currencies were 
overvalued before the crisis. In particular, the AMU DI of the Indonesian rupiah had the 
largest overvaluation among the Asian currencies (Figure 4a). Figure 4b shows that the 
AMU DIs of the Thai baht and the Malaysian ringgit were also overvalued by more than 
20%. On one hand, the AMU DI of the Korean won was overvalued by less than 10% 
when the Thai baht started to collapse in July 1997. After that, it climbed gradually up 
to 17% of overvaluation. It started to depreciate sharply to almost minus-40% of 
undervaluation in December 1997. Thus, the movements in the AMU DIs exactly 
replicated the scenario of currency crisis contagion from Thailand to Korea. In contrast, 
the AMU DIs of the Singapore dollar, the Chinese yuan, and the Japanese yen were 
undervalued before the Asian currency crisis. In particular, those of the Chinese yuan 
and the Japanese yen were below minus-20% of undervaluation, which means that the 
crisis-hit currencies were more than 40% overvalued compared with the two major 




Figure 4: AMU Deviation Indicators in Asian Crisis (March 1997–December 1998) 
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Observing movements in both the AMU and the AMU DIs during the Asian currency 
crisis, we find that the AMU was more than 20% overvalued vis-à-vis the US dollar, and 
the crisis-hit currencies were more than 40% overvalued compared with the Chinese 
yuan and the Japanese yen. These results suggest that monetary authorities should 
monitor the AMU and the AMU DIs to predict currency crises in the near future. 
5.2  AMU during the Recent Global Financial Crisis 
Some Asian currencies have been depreciating against the US dollar as a result of the 
sell-off of local currencies accompanying capital outflows, which were related to the 
deleveraging  policies  by US and European financial institutions beginning in  2007. 
These dramatic events transpired as a result of the Lehman shock on 15 September 
2008. Among Asian currencies, the only exception was the Japanese yen, which has 
appreciated substantially against the US dollar. The Chinese yuan has been kept 
relatively stable vis-à-vis the US dollar by the Chinese monetary authority’s heavy 
intervention in the foreign exchange market, even during the global financial crisis. The 
Singapore dollar and the Malaysia ringgit have also  not depreciated considerably 
against the US dollar because these two countries’ monetary authorities have kept a 
currency basket system. In contrast, the Korean won has had much larger depreciation 
than any other Asian currency. The Thai baht and the Indonesian rupiah also have 
depreciated due to the subprime mortgage problem and fallout from the demise of 
Lehman Brothers.  
Figure 5 shows movements in the AMU DIs from January 2000 to March 2010. It is 
clear that the Asian currencies have been widening in terms of increasing weighted 
averages of the AMU DIs, just as Ogawa and Yoshimi (2008) have pointed out. The 
increasing weighted averages of the AMU DIs might reflect regional trade imbalances 
in some instances, since the benchmark period to calculate AMU DIs is set as the 
period when total trade balances (intra-regional trade balances) of Asian countries was 
closest to zero. Figure 6 shows movements in trade balances within the region (by 
country) from the first quarter of 2000 to the fourth quarter of 2009. Regional trade 
imbalances have been growing as the weighted average of AMU DIs has increased. 
Notably,  the  large regional trade surplus  suddenly  became  a large deficit once the 
subprime crisis hit in the third quarter of 2008. These findings suggest that sudden and 
volatile movements in the AMU DIs have negative impacts on intra-regional trade 
among Asian countries. ADBI Working Paper 275    Ogawa and Shimizu 
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Volatile movements in the AMU DIs might also  be caused by erratic capital flows. 
Suppose that we set a plus/minus-15% fluctuation band for the AMU DIs where this 
band is the same as the fluctuation band in Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) II in the 
EU. Figure 5 shows that most of the Asian currencies except for the Philippine peso 
stayed within the band during the period from 2000 to 2005. Since 2006, however, an 
AMU DI of the Korean won started to rise beyond the upper band of 15%, an upward 
trend followed by the Thai baht and the Singapore dollar. In contrast, an AMU DI of the 
Japanese yen was undervalued.  
What caused the currencies to deviate from their benchmark levels? One possible 
answer is a carry trade between the Japanese yen and other currencies. As a funding 
currency, the Japanese yen was highly involved in carry trade strategies because of 
Japan’s  extremely low interest rates throughout the  2000s.
8 It is said that higher 
interest rates for other Asian currencies, such as the Korean won and the Thai baht 
facilitated the yen-related carry trade. As Gyntelberg  et al.  (2009)  has shown,  net 
purchases of Thai equities by non-resident investors led to appreciation of the Thai 
baht in 2007, implying that the movement in capital flows is an  important factor in 
destabilizing intra-regional exchange rates.
9
In the rest of this section, we investigate relationships between the AMU DIs and 
capital flows. We focus on three volatile Asian currencies—the Korean won, the 
Indonesian rupiah, and the Thai baht—and compare their AMU DIs and capital flows—
especially  the  “other  investments”  listed on  their  balance-of-payments  sheets—by 
using data from the  IMF’s “International Financial Statistics.”  Figure 7 shows 
relationships between the AMU DIs and the “other investments” for the three countries.  
  
In the case of Korea, the AMU DI went up gradually from the middle of 2004 and was 
kept above 15% from the second quarter of 2006 through the fourth quarter of 2007. 
During this period, the Republic of Korea had large capital inflows on the liability side of 
“other investments.” In the third quarter of 2008, the AMU DI of the Korean won went 
down  sharply,  below minus-15% of undervaluation. At the same time, large capital 
outflows occurred on both the liability and asset sides of “other investment.” In the case 
of Indonesia, large capital outflows occurred on the asset side of “other Investments” in 
                                                 
8 Hottori and Shin (2007) confirmed that the volumes of carry trade involving the yen were high when 
interest differential against the yen were high.  
9 Plantin and Shin (2006) express that a high-yield currency will exhibit the classic price pattern of going 
“up by the stairs” and coming “down with the elevator.” ADBI Working Paper 275    Ogawa and Shimizu 
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the third quarter of 2008, while the AMU DI of the Indonesian rupiah went down below 
15% of undervaluation.  
The case of Thailand is different from that of Korea and Indonesia. When the AMU DI 
of the Thai baht climbed up above 15% of overvaluation during the period from the first 
quarter of 2007 to the first quarter of 2008, Thailand had no large capital inflows except 
in the first quarter of 2008. This was probably due to the capital controls suddenly 
introduced by the Bank of Thailand in December 2006, which were eliminated on 3 
March 2008. In fact, the Thai baht did not sharply depreciate like the other two 
currencies during the recent global financial crisis.  
These findings indicate that the AMU DI's reach to an upper band—for example, plus-
15% of the fluctuation band—could alert countries to excess capital inflows that might 
cause capital outflows thereafter. Thus, monitoring  the AMU DIs  may be  useful to 
predict excess capital inflows and outflows from the country.  
6.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have shown that monitoring the AMU and the AMU DIs plays an 
important role in the regional surveillance process in Asia. Daily and monthly data of 
the AMU and AMU DIs can be used to monitor intra-regional exchange rates among 
Asian currencies. Our investigation of the AMU and the AMU DIs suggest the following: 
First, the AMU peg system stabilizes the NEERs of East Asian currencies. Second, the 
AMU and the AMU DIs just before the Asian currency crisis in 1997 showed that a 
weighted average of the Asian currencies was overvalued against the US dollar, while 
the currencies of crisis-hit countries also were overvalued against the other Asian 
currencies. Thus, both the AMU and the AMU DIs could have  signaled  the 
overvaluation of the Asian currencies before the Asian currency crisis. Third, trade 
imbalances within the region were growing as the AMU DIs were widening among 
Asian currencies. Fourth, the AMU DIs can help predict excess capital inflows into the 
countries and capital outflows from the countries. The findings support the usefulness 
of using both the AMU and the AMU DIs as a surveillance indicator for monetary 
cooperation in Asia. 
Practical ways to utilize the AMU DI as a surveillance indicator should be discussed in 
future research. For example, determining an appropriate fluctuation band for the AMU 
DI is an important issue. In order to decide the height of the band, we need to analyze 
the relationship between interest differentials and capital inflows/outflows. This paper ADBI Working Paper 275    Ogawa and Shimizu 
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focused on the AMU and the AMU DIs only in terms of nominal exchange rates. The 
nominal AMU and AMU DIs are therefore suitable for daily surveillance over nominal 
exchange rates and capital inflows/outflows. However, we need to use the AMU and 
the AMU DI in terms of real exchange rates for macroeconomic surveillance over 
exports/imports, trade balances, as well as FDI. These are issues that warrant further 
research in future. 
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APPENDIX: THE AMU AND AMU DEVIATION INDICATOR 
Calculating the AMU 
We calculated the AMU according to the approach employed for calculating the 
European Currency Unit (ECU) under the EMS before the introduction of the euro in 
1999. Just as the ECU was defined as a basket of currencies of member countries of 
the European Union (EU), the AMU has been defined as a basket of currencies of the 
ASEAN 10+3 countries (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao  People’s Democratic 
Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam, Japan, 
the People’s Republic of China, and Korea). The weight assigned to each currency in 
this basket is based on the share of GDP measured at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
and  the  overall trade volumes (the sum of exports and imports) of each sample 
country. We calculated the share of GDP measured at PPP and trade volumes for each 
country using the average of the last three years in order to arrive at the currency 
shares of the AMU (the current version is based on 2005–2007).  
Since both the United States and EU countries are important trading partners for East 
Asia, the AMU is quoted in terms of a weighted average of the US dollar and the euro. 
The weighted average of the US dollar and the euro (hereafter, US$-euro) is based on 
the trade volumes of East Asian countries with the United States and EU. The weights 
assigned to the US dollar and euro were 65% and 35%, respectively. 
Subsequently, we selected a benchmark period in order to calculate AMU Deviation 
Indicators. The benchmark period was defined in the following manner: the total trade 
balance of member countries (intra-regional trade balance), total trade balance of the 
member countries with Japan (excluding Japan), and total trade balance of member 
countries with the rest of world must be approximately zero. Consequently, it was found 
that the trade balance in 2001 was the closest to zero. Assuming a one-year time lag 
before changes in exchange rates affect trade volumes, we chose 2000 and 2001 as 
the benchmark period. For the benchmark period, the exchange rate of the AMU in 
terms of the US$-euro was set at unity. We defined the exchange rate of each East 
Asian currency in terms of the AMU during the benchmark period as the benchmark 
exchange rate. ADBI Working Paper 275    Ogawa and Shimizu 
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Overall, the AMU weights were calculated based on both the arithmetic share of trade 
volumes and GDP measured at PPP. The table below indicates the AMU basket 
weights and benchmark exchange rates. 
AMU Basket Weights of East Asian Currencies 
(revised in 10/2010****, benchmark year=2000/2001)
Trade












Brunei     0.35 0.13 0.24 0.589114 0.0041
Cambodia 0.21 0.17 0.19 0.000270 6.9779
People’s Republic of China 26.48 46.65 36.57 0.125109 2.9228
Indonesia 5.68 5.54 5.61 0.000113 497.9163
Japan  22.40 28.15 25.28 0.009065 27.8842
Republic of Korea 13.03 8.27 10.65 0.000859 123.9422
Laos 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.000136 7.5226
Malaysia 7.37 2.36 4.87 0.272534 0.1786
Myanmar  0.37 0.37 0.37 0.159215 0.0232
Philippines 2.22 1.95 2.09 0.021903 0.9527
Singapore 12.74 1.48 7.11 0.589160 0.1207
Thailand  6.54 3.41 4.98 0.024543 2.0272
Viet Nam 2.48 1.44 1.96 0.000072 273.9808
**** : AMU shares and weights were reviced in Oct. 2010. This is the 6th version.
* : The trade volume is calculated as the average of total export and import volumes in 2006, 2007 and 2008 taken from
DOTS (IMF).
**: GDP measured at PPP is the average of GDP measured at PPP in 2006, 2007 and 2008 taken from the World
Development Report, World Bank. For Myanmar's share of GDP measured at PPP, we use the sahre of Trade volume
because of the data constraint.
*** : The Benchmark exchange rate ($-euro/Currency) is the average of the daily exchange rate in terms of US$-euro in
2000 and 2001.
Source: RIETI (http://www.rieti.go.jp/users/amu/en/index.html)  
Calculating the AMU Deviation Indicator 
The nominal exchange rate of each East Asian currency in terms of the AMU is used in 
order to determine its AMU Deviation Indicator. The AMU Deviation Indicator signifies 
the deviation of each East Asian currency from the benchmark exchange rate vis-à-vis 
the AMU, and is represented by a formula in the following manner:  
. 100
currency   a
AMU   of   rate   exchange benchmark 
currency   a
AMU   of   rate   exchange benchmark  currency   a
AMU   of   rate   exchange   actual





When the AMU deviation indicator of,  say, currency A is positive, it implies that 
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exchange rate vis-à-vis the AMU (this represents an appreciation of currency A against 
the AMU). Similarly, when the AMU deviation indicator of say, currency A, is negative, 
it implies that currency A’s actual exchange rate vis-à-vis the AMU is lower than its 
benchmark exchange rate vis-à-vis the AMU (this represents a depreciation of currency 
A against the AMU)  